Soft Targets

Soft targets are an especially challenging situation for safety and security experts to protect. Soft targets are basically any facility or location that may be attacked by a terrorist but lacks the surveillance and security systems to be considered hardened (such as a military base or nuclear power plant). The recent shootings in Omaha and Colorado Springs brought all of this to mind the other day. We have been so focused on protecting targets of national significance (Wall Street, the Hoover Dam, the Statue of Liberty, the Sears Tower, etc.) we tend to overlook other targets of opportunity for a terrorist to attack. To illustrate my point, allow me to use the city of Dayton which is about 50 miles north of Cincinnati with a population of around 160,000. At first look, it doesn’t appear to be much of a target for a terrorist with its relatively small population and distance away from a major metropolitan area such as Chicago or New York. However, there are many reasons why Dayton (and other small or medium sized cities) could become the next target for a terrorist attack.

Dayton hosts several festivals in its downtown area around the Five Rivers MetroPark each year. Thousands of people stroll along the streets and river during the Spring and Summer months walking amongst city streets that have been blocked off. Such a large mass of people out in the open and defended by a relatively small police force could be attacked with any number of chemical or biological agents. The terrorist motive of course is to induce panic so the weapon doesn’t even have to be a real chemical or biological agent as long as the populace becomes afraid and chaos ensues. Despite its small size Dayton has two major universities, Wright State University to the east and University of Dayton located immediately south of the downtown. The combined student enrollment of the two universities is over 20,000. Colleges and universities are designed to be open and thus are especially susceptible to attack. We saw earlier this year what one lone gunmen can do at Virginia Tech, it would not take much to launch a more concerted effort to produce even higher casualties at either of the Dayton campuses. The would-be terrorist need not be successful in executing the attack in order to be effective. The fear and panic caused by what MIGHT happen could seriously cripple university life for many weeks. Many cities such as Dayton have a minor league baseball team. Fifth Third Field (there is also a ballpark by the same name in Toledo) seats over 7,000 fans and is located just north of the downtown. It would not be difficult to fly a small aircraft either over the crowd (with the intent of dropping some type of weapon on to the field) or to actually fly the aircraft into the stands. Of course, I have intentionally left the biggest target in the Dayton area until last. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base has a combined workforce population of over 13,000 according to latest U.S. Census figures. Many large military installations exist near small communities (Offut AFB near Omaha or Scott AFB near Belleville, IL come to mind).

The natural tendency is to assume the attack will be directed at the base. However, as most military installations are hardened with a highly trained security force and sophisticated surveillance systems other targets associated with the base are much easier to attack. Rather than go after the base itself, a potential terrorist may target a neighborhood with a large base population. Most base personnel have DoD decals (or other military decals) on their windshields making it easy to identify large concentrations of military families. Launching an attack against a neighborhood presents few deterrents compared to attacking a military installation. A frightening scenario related to attacking a neighborhood is to target a school with a large population of children whose parents work on base. It is not feasible to hardened either of these targets to the degree of a military base nor would most citizens want to live on a military styled compound.

What makes any of these attacks especially alarming is the size of Dayton. A quick search on Google shows only four major hospitals in the Dayton area (not including the hospital on Wright-Patterson). A terrorist attack that produces multiple casualties could quickly overwhelm the medical treatment facilities in the Dayton area. Fifth Third Field alone could produce several thousands casualties in the event of a terrorist attack during a game. The efforts for first responders to treat and transport all of the casualties out of the ballpark would take hours. The traffic problems could grid-lock the city for many more hours or even days. Merely the threat of an attack could create many problems for the city. Funding for homeland security is not sufficient to deal with all of these potential targets and Dayton has to compete with targets in the six other major cities in Ohio.

Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal agencies, take the position that protecting soft targets is strictly a state or local responsibility. Those familiar with FEMA guidance for dealing with the avian flu know not to expect any assistance from agencies outside the state, basically each state will be on their own. Protection of soft targets in areas outside of New York or Washington, D.C. are in a similar situation, namely the federal government is not resourced to cover every potential soft target. Dayton and other similarly sized cities have multiple targets that could be the subject of attack, yet their national significance is such that little in the way of federal assistance can be expected. More than ever, cities like Dayton need to collaborate with other cities in developing strategies to best prepare and protect their residents from terrorist attacks. Local law enforcement agencies in conjunction with citizens are perhaps the strongest preventive mechanism available to a city. Police officers and the citizens they protect know who belongs in the area and who doesn’t. Citizens know when people in the neighborhood are up to suspicious behavior or activities. Building and fostering this cooperation isn’t always easy. In many communities relations between police officers and local citizens are poor. Even in those neighborhoods were police and citizens cooperate, there is still a stigma of “snitching” to the law or fear of retribution should they report suspicious activity to the police. Fire and EMS personnel are also becoming part of the eyes and ears of counter-terrorism. Exactly because they aren’t law enforcement, fire and EMS personnel may learn of suspicious activity which can they be used to prevent an attack.

All of this of course is pointless without a strategy to coordinate all of these agencies efforts along with a mechanism to share the information. Many states now have intelligence fusion centers to cross-reference information from multiple agencies within the state. The centers are an important step in creating an environment where information can be shared. The personnel in these centers are highly trained but even so are unable (usually) to add the local perspective to a particular report. Thus it is so critical to develop and enhance the cooperation at the local level between citizens and responding agencies. They are the ones who will first note a change in behavior or activity. None of this will matter though if the information isn’t used to help citizens prepare to deter or protect themselves from an attack. Virginia Tech did not have a strategy in place to quickly inform students that a shooter was on a rampage and such a strategy may have prevented additional deaths. Similarly a community has to have a way to communicate a potential threat exists and must communicate to the residents what steps to take to prevent or reduce the likelihood of attack. City officials of course may be reluctant to share information for fear of creating a panic and most likely this would occur if residents have not been involved with the process previously. There are many challenges to implementing a cooperative strategy between local government and residents on this level. The education and training to make this actually work would have to be well-planned out and continuous. There are many challenges to such a strategy and it may ultimately prove too difficult to implement in some cities. However, if the city officials accept the threat to their soft targets than in becomes a matter of principle and honor to do something about it. When you think about it, this isn’t much different than what Civil Defense was used for back in the 1950’s although this will be a much more pro-active model with the goal of not just surviving an attack but outright prevention.